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2Abstract
As market conditions change rapidly in the 21st century, questions arise concerning how
the organizational structures of co-operatives (co-ops) can meet the challenges that these
new conditions pose. This paper introduces a framework to structure marketing co-ops
(MCs) based on members’ preferences. Several notions from the behavioral decision
theory framework are utilized, and a principal-agent approach is adopted for the design of
this framework. It focuses on the subjective utility that co-op members derive from levels
of the MCs’ firm-behavioral attributes, such as business issue/scope, corporate
governance, product-related decision-making, financial structure, member benefits, and
product quality. Data was collected by means of in-depth interviews with 30 producers
and 120 structured computer-assisted face-to-face interviews. The utilities that producers
attached to MC’s attributes were derived by means of a conjoint experiment.
Key-words: marketing co-op’s structure, members’ preferences, conjoint analysis.
1. Introduction
Co-ops find themselves competing in a volatile environment. Consumer concerns for
food quality and safety, market deregulations due to changes in agricultural policy,
technological changes, and globalization, press farmers and food producers to
continuously seek the most efficient business structures. The re-engineering of co-op
structures towards more individualized business models recently led several authors ( see
Rogers & Caswell; Rhodes; LeVay; Cook, 1995; Hind;  Nilsson, 1998; Sykuta & Cook)
to call for research that examines the determinants of the co-op’s internal organizational
structure.
3The economic literature distinguishes four main orientations to studying co-op
business organizations. The initial modeling efforts of cooperation in 1940s resulted in
the development of the ‘vertical-integrated’ or ‘multiplant-firm’ modeling approach
(Emelianoff;  Robotka; Philips). This is one of the most popular theories amongst co-op
researchers today (e.g., Bonus; Schrader; Hendrikse and Bijman). It views agricultural
co-ops as a type of vertical integration between farming operations, processing, and
marketing functions, which are controlled by their members. These are the main criteria
that distinguish co-ops from other member-controlled organizations such as trade-unions,
corporations, and political parties (Sexton, 1995).  This approach denies the business
nature of a co-op and it puts emphasis on the aggregate structuring of independent
economic agents. The major criticism of this approach was the Gournot-Nash equilibrium
assumption implied in this multiplant-firm model.
The impracticality of the vertical-integration assumptions allowed for Enke’s and
Helmberger and Hoos studies on consumer and MCs, to be the cornerstones of the so-
called ‘cooperative as a firm’ or ‘cooperative as an independent firm’. Enke first
mentioned that if the co-op maximizes the sum of co-op members’ surplus, then the
welfare of co-op members and society are maximized.  In other words, equilibrium
occurs when the sum of co-op profits and the patron benefits are maximized. In order to
attain such a centralized goal, a hierarchical decision-making operational framework is
required. This is known in co-op economic literature as the “welfare maximizing
solution” (Le Vay).  Nevertheless, posterior analysts recognized the difficulty in attaining
welfare-maximizing solutions relative to price-taking versions. Thus, this solution does
not obtain equilibrium under a purely patronage–based financing system.
4New co-op economic theories began to emerge in the 1980’s, and particularly
focused on the issue of member heterogeneity and risk behavior (Staatz, 1989). The
contractual basis of a co-op’s entrepreneurship is known in co-op economic literature as
the ‘nexus of contracts’ theory. This approach views all types of business relationships
amongst members as strictly contractual relationships (a.o. see Hart & Moore; Hendrikse
& Veerman, 2001). Furthermore, a behavioral and application-oriented line of co-op
research, known as the ‘coalition’ approach, can also be distinguished. The primary
interest of experimental economists in this field (a.o. see Staatz, 1987; Vercammen et al.;
Hendrikse) is the recognition of existing coalitions within the co-op environment. The
latest two behavioral-based approaches are considered as the alternatives to neo-classical
co-op analysis, which views the co-op firm as a vertical integrated business system or an
independent economic organization.
This paper has adopted the behavioral theory of the firm, developed by March,
Simon and Cyert, to investigate the process of decision-making within a MC.  The
economic function of a horticultural MC is the maximization of net proceeds for
producing farmers, in particular by adding value to the member’s products. We view the
MC firm as a coalition of utility maximizing participants. The member-participants, who
are owners and controllers, create an organizational structure through their collective
behavior, within there are multiple functional and organizational activities to be
performed. However, modern co-ops, besides their members, have more participants
involved in their decision-making process, such as the board of directors (BOD), hired
management, organized laborers and bankers, and each group has its own views and
preferences about the behavior of the co-op (Staatz, 1983).  LeVay listed all of these
5decision-making actors with their possible goals for the co-op, and argues that their
preferences on numerous organizational issues may differ from those of the co-op
members.
Many studies have theorized on co-op’s management without taking heed of
empirical evidence concerning the members’ as firms in their own right. Member firms
face changing needs, stemming from market developments, and preference change due to
changes in their entrepreneurial behavior.  We propose that empirical studies of
members’ preference for the co-op’s internal functioning will reveal crucial information.
This information can be used to then determine preferred organizational modes of their
joint economic behavior, or, in other words, of their market agent. There is otherwise the
risk, as Fulton and Giannakas have recently shown, that when members feel the co-op is
not operating in their interests, the co-op’s quality is perceived to be low.
We apply a principal-agent theoretic framework (Jensen and Meckling; Fama and
Jensen) and view MC as an entrepreneurial coalition owned and managed by its
principals, who co-operate as peers (see Alchian and Demsetz; Douma and Schrouder).
This framework seems capable in significantly extending the coalition perspective,
through its contribution to a more advanced discussion of the relations between the
members (the many relatively small principals) and their co-op (agent). The coalition’s
entrepreneurs (principals) who are involved in coordinating and monitoring the
organizational aspects of the coalition (agent), behave in a bounded rational manner
(March  and Simon). They are the only legally authorized decision-makers that can
provide information about organizational guidelines and their twofold business-role in the
two layers of co-op entrepreneurship. While they do cope with real daily decision-making
6at their farm level, they also are the decision-makers at the co-op (agent) level, who
control and monitor the operational framework of the hired decision-making participants.
Thus, we argue that in order to understand the dynamics of co-op organizational
structures, we need to investigate the preferences of these entrepreneurs on the
organizational structures of their agents.  The coalition of participants, or agent’s
organizational structure, is simply defined as the sum of total relationships in which its
principals’ (farmer-members) overall utility on their invested resources is achieved,
through the co-ordination of their co-op’s distinct internal organizational aspects and
options. This notion is closely linked with the conceptualization of the firm as a “system
of relationships” (Coase), where consistencies between these relationships are of great
importance (Williamson). These relationships are therefore recognized as “distinctly
separated clusters of firm characteristics” (Milgrom and Roberts), and their effective
matching can influence positively the MC’s performance (e.g., Hendrikse & Veerman,
1997).
The current research develops a model that optimize the organizational structure of
co-op firms, subject to its own particular relationships that are specified as a distinct set
of behavioral organizational attributes. We conceptualize this procedure in a principal-
agent framework where farmer-members, as user-owners and user-controllers, have a
twofold decision-making role in the two layers of co-op entrepreneurship, that of member
firms and that of co-op firm.  If principals reveal their preferences, and thus the levels of
the utility they derive from their relationships, insight can be gained in the member-
incentives to invest in the agent. This will also advance our understanding of how the co-
op’s managerial framework should be formulated. The paper is structured as follows. In
7section 2, we will provide an overview of the structural and strategic relationships of
modern co-op organizations. Section 3 presents the decision context and methodological
design of the survey followed by a brief description of the conjoint modeling framework
and the conjoint design of our study. In section 4 we present the results of conjoint
experiment. The paper ends with a discussion about the potential theoretical contribution
of this study as well as the analysis’s limitations and suggestions for further research are
discussed.
2. The Transformation of Co-op’s Structural Relationships.
The success of the market-driven organization in the agri-food sector is based on a
range of organizational choices, which increase interdependence as well as ensure the
ability to produce to specifications (Boehlje et al.).  Shifts towards consumer driven
market channels, merging competitors and technical and organizational innovations make
markets complex. They also compel agri-businesses to reconsider their organizational
strategic behavior and develop new forms for turbulent environments (Achrol; Day).
Presently, several agricultural market-driven co-ops are undergoing changes in their
organizational structure (a.o. see Cook, 1996; Nilsson, 2001; van Dijk, 1997).  As the
complexity of co-ops increases, in terms of size, composition of its membership, market
strategy, and internal business operations, new individualized structural solutions are
suggested including defined membership, proportional voting schemes, differentiated
internal pricing schemes, and tradable residual claims (van Dijk, 1999). Thus, a growing
number of agricultural co-ops introduce individualization in addition to traditional
collectivized co-op structure (see table 1). As a result, individualized structural choices
8become possible new forms of co-operation, thus seem better equipped to effectively
compete in the current demands of the global business environment.
In this paper, we argue that the determinants, that drive the internal organizational
structure of modern market-driven co-op organizations, can be effectively derived from
both the existing theories of the firm and the unique features of modern co-op
entrepreneurship. We argue that the decision-making processes within the firm’s internal
environment starts with the definition of the firm’s goals (Douma and Schreuder).  In
order to explore the co-op’s responses to shaping agricultural marketing functions (either
upstream or downstream), their role in a market-oriented economy should be specified
(Sexton, 1986).  Hence, we expect that the co-op’s business issue/scope is an important
basic determinant of the co-op firm’s structure. By viewing a co-op firm as a coalition of
different groups of participants, we assume that as heterogeneous participants will have
their own particular objectives and goals, the common goals of a co-op firm are therefore
achieved through a bargaining process.
Furthermore, following the definition of co-op as a user-oriented business form, a co-
op structure can be interpreted as essentially consisting of three behavioral dimensions.
According to Garoryan, these theoretical constructs are: the aspects of member financing
of capital (ownership/investment); the decision and control process (governance),
including the role of the board-of-directors (BOD) and other decision-making participants
(hired management); and the methods for allocating costs and returns to members
(benefits distribution). The farmer-members collectively own the co-op’s assets, and they
are user-owners of the co-op’s risk bearing capital to a dominating degree, in the form of
direct investment, retained patronage refunds, per unit-capital retains (Cobia & Brewer).
9Table 1. Co-op Structure: Traditional Collectivized vs. Modern Individualized
Structural Factors Traditional Co-ops Individualized co-ops
Investments
• Financial entry Open, free and costless entry Closed entry or subject to purchase of
production right
• Residual claims rights Permanent and non-tradable Tradable among members.
Equity Structure & Returns
• Equity’s form Collectivizing structure Individualizing Shares
• Pricing policy Uniform nominal price with
minimum quality criteria
Differentiated pricing with respect to
produce content and quality criteria
Governance
• Decision-making rights Farmer’s Board of the Directors full
delegation
Decision rights are delegated by   a
Farmer’s Board of the Directors, on
behalf of members individually and
management
• Voting principle Full democratic control (one man
one vote)
Proportional  to individualized stocks
Source: see text
Cook (1995) distinguishes three investment-related efficiency problems, for cases
where the property rights of common equity are not well defined. These three are the free
rider problem, horizon problem and portfolio problem. The free rider problem concerns
situations where new members can enjoy profit from joining the co-op without having to
pay a fixed entrance fee, or when non-members can profit from the marketing activities
of a co-op for generic products. The horizon problem rises when a farmer member
investing in a co-op’s marketing activities or financial activities, is unlikely to feel that he
can participate fully in the potential benefits. This happens because part of the net cash
flow will be retained in the co-op firms, and hence shared with future members. Thus, the
horizon problem occurs if an investment pays-off in the long-run. Finally, the portfolio
problem concerns the reluctance of co-op members or investors to invest. Members of a
co-op are obliged to invest in proportion to their use of co-ops. They can thus have a
portfolio problem as their claims on assets (share in a co-op) cannot be freely bought or
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sold, and so they are inhibited from diversifying or concentrating their investment
portfolio to take account of their personal wealth and their preferences for risk taking.
The literature suggests both theoretically and empirically, that the members’
incentives to invest in the co-op would be enhanced if the property rights of the co-op
were better defined. Eilers and Hanf address the issue of optimal contract design in co-op
firms by utilizing a principal-agent theoretic framework. They conclude that such a
framework may be an extremely useful tool in analyzing member investment incentives.
Cook and Illiopoulos have empirically tested the co-op’s efficiency when property rights
are defined, and found that members of closed membership policy, defined marketing
agreements, and transferable delivery rights, are more willing to invest in their co-op.
These co-op models are called new generation co-ops (Harris et al.). Hendrikse and
Bijman conceptualize the impact of ownership structure on investments in a multiple tier
net-chain. They utilize a property rights incomplete contract framework, and they
generate first-best efficient ownership structures given alternate investment situations.
Modern co-ops have relaxed the exclusively generic constraints of co-op equity (and
of therefore their financial structure), by adopting other investment-driven financing
methods than just general reserves, in response to tremendous own-equity needs. In fact,
many of the modern-day American and European co-ops (Cook, 1996; Nadeau and
Thompson; van Dijk, 1996) enjoy a scheme of more individualized financial equity. They
are expanding their risk-bearing tools by means of long-term loans or certificates issued
to members with a fixed return (certificates and member loans). This option offers the
possibility that members reserve capital for the co-op, which is still assigned to a specific
member. Hence, this form leads to more individualized co-op financing forms.
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In contrast with other economic organizations, only member-users have the
possibility to affect their organization’s objectives and strategies. The growth of co-op
firms, however, due to vertical integration, strategic alliances, and mergers, implies an
increasing complexity in decision-making. This has brought the need for professional
management (van Dijk, 1997), although the co-op’s BOD dominates the decision-making
process (Henehan and Anderson).  Comparing investor-owned firm’s (IOF’s) and co-op’s
board function, Staatz (1984) states that co-op’s board serves as both a trustee for the
investors, (like the trustee of IOF’s shareholders) and a representative of the co-op’s
customers. This is an important aspect of a co-op firm, because the concerns of its user-
owners conveyed to management.
The co-op governance relationship, also called control relationship, thus involves the
participation and monitoring of the co-op’s decision-making procedures, as taken by all
co-op decision-making participants. According to the traditional co-op model, members
should have only one vote in the general assembly that elects the BOD. Co-op firms
follow this rule in several countries including the USA and Germany (Reynolds et al.),
but in several other countries (i.e the Netherlands) almost all co-ops use proportional
voting (van Bekkum & van Dijk)1. This condition of proportionality in voting power has
stirred farmers to co-operate in new ways, and has caused the restructuring of long-
standing governance schemes. According to Egerstrom, these investment-driven co-ops
have resolved issues regarding co-op property rights and free-rider memberships. They
also have asset appreciation mechanisms, delivery rights mechanisms, proportional
                                                          
1 The latest means that a member holds more votes the more use he makes of the services of co-op firm. Often a
maximum number of votes per members is defined.    
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patronizing distribution, and individualized allocation of benefits methods, all of which
are based on investment-driven equity capital plans.
The combination of the above mentioned realities in co-op entrepreneurship can
be characterized as the original reasons for co-operation in a state of flux (van Dijk,
1997).  Farmer-members as modern entrepreneurs make investments in such a way that
new markets are created, where the members can add value with their land, labor and
capital investments, and skills. Clearly, the study of an internal co-op’s restructuring
should not only focus on the co-op’s internal hierarchy. Co-ops are challenged with the
boundary between what is produced within the firm and what is contracted for markets
like any other firm type (Rogers and Caswell). Thus, entrepreneurial strategies of
member-producers require a more direct link with their market segments, and product
quality emerged as one of the key-determinants for the building of a market-driven co-op
organization. By creating differentiated products, and therefore non-uniform pricing
mechanisms, firms appeal to different buyer segments. This will then strengthen their
position in the market, and ameliorate economic inefficiencies associated with uniform
pricing methods (Fulton & Vercammen, 1995).  This is the point where farmers-members
have reached their goal. As a result of their market-oriented business structure, the
demand for quality products is enchanted, performance of co-op is expressed in the value
of their shares linked to their individualized own equity, and profit is made.
To summarize, we define the internal co-op structure as comprising of the behavioral
relationships between members and the co-op. These are the ownership/investment,
governance, and benefits allocation relationships. In order to build-up a complete and
coherent co-op structure model, we also consider other organizational and strategic
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behavioral attributes. These are the specificities of the business issue/scope of market-
driven co-ops, as well as the strategic focus on a product’s quality of co-op firms,
determined at industry-wide levels or within final consumer market segments. Each of the
above mentioned internal co-op structure’s determinants may de described in terms of a
number of options. Regarding this definition of a co-op structure model, we investigate
the member preferences for market-driven co-ops that are organized with different
degrees of organizational and strategic relationships of the collectivized vs.
individualized co-op model.
3. Modeling Framework and Methods.
3.1. Decision Context
We study co-op members preference structure for particular attributes of the co-op
organizational structure for a Dutch co-op, called VTN/The Greenery. Formally, The
Greenery is a distribution, sales, and marketing company of fresh produce whose shares
are owned by the horticultural co-op Voedings Tuinbouw Nederland (VTN).  The 3,000
producer-owned companies that are members of VTN sell their products through The
Greenery. This type of marketing channel exists for a wide variety of fresh commodities,
such as tomatoes, green-salads, apples, strawberries, etc. The companies in this
commodity-marketing channel are relatively small and most of them are family owned,
with the manager often times being the owner.
We will use conjoint analysis as a statistical tool to determine the utility that co-
op members attach to the various organizational characteristics of a co-op. Conjoint
analysis allows us to derive at the “optimal” co-op structure based on co-op members
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preference (utility) structure. First we will describe the research design that enabled us to
arrive at the relevant co-op characteristics, subsequently we specify the conjoint model.
3.2 Research Design
Design of Qualitative Research
Initially, a desk research was conducted in which the current literature on co-op
attributes was evaluated. Next, the relevant attributes and levels of co-ops were
determined, based on both, the theory as well as in focus group discussions with the
members of VTN/The Greenery. Two focus-group sessions were conducted, in which
several characteristics, called attributes, of the co-op in relation to its organizational
structure was discussed. These attributes were derived from relevant literature sources, as
well as from several discussions between co-op experts from the research team and the
managerial employees of VTN/The Greenery. The two sessions were held on different
days (one at the end of March and one at mid-April 2002, because the workload of
members tends to be relatively low then) and in different locations, in order to facilitate
full participation. To ensure the participation of at least ten members per session, a total
of 20 members were recruited for each discussion. Member selection was based on
certain demographic variables (age of member’s company, region in which company is
located), product-related (heterogeneity of members regarding  products, protected or
unprotected cultivation), and economic (business size and structure) criteria, as well as on
the degree to which they are involved in their own marketing co-op’s functioning
(participation in producer’s meeting, general assembly, etc). Ultimately, 15 members
participated in each session.
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Focus group results
The two focus-group discussions gave almost the same results, and revealed no
need for a third session. The participants provided various arguments that three out of the
eight proposed attributes (Advantage of Membership, Membership Policy and
Competitive Strategy) should not be considered as structural options of a modern co-op.
The main argument was that the proposed aspects are more related to the nature of the
business’ constitutional arrangements, and thus they already need to be defined as
internal regulations in the early stages of co-op establishment.
Of the remaining five attributes, three were considered extremely important for
the formulation of the co-op’s organizational structure. Other suggestions given by the
focus groups pertained to the wording of these three attributes and the feasibility of their
different levels. Thus, the attribute Multi-/Single-Purpose was renamed Business Issue/
Scope, and Distribution of Wealth as Members’ Benefits. For the attribute Financial
Structure, the number of levels was decreased from five to two. Almost half of the
participants strongly insisted that in order to formulate a modern financial structure,
Individualized Equity should be derived, and the other half accepted the usual Co-op
Norm of General Reserves. The other three levels  (Members’ Out -of-Pocket
Investments, Co-op Totally Financed by Members, Co-op Financed by Members and
External Investors) were considered not feasible. Therefore, they were not included in the
empirical study.
Notwithstanding the various options about the members’ role in the MC decision-
making and organizational procedures discussed in the focus-group sessions, the
members also clarified that managers and members are both useful in the decision-
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making process and the hierarchical structure, but in a different manner. They mentioned
that the key decisional procedures in which members and managers are engaged are
different due to the nature of the tasks. Hence, product-related decision-making is an
issue on one hand, and, on the other, the co-op’s corporate governance should be
considered.
Table 2. Attributes and levels of the conjoint study
Attribute Levels
Entrepreneurial Market-Oriented OrganizationBusiness Issue/Scope
Intermediary Organization
VTN: governed by Board of Directors (Members)
The Greenery Ltd.: governed by Managers under the supervision of the Board of
Directors of VTN
Corporate
Governance
VTN: governed by Managers under supervision of Board of Directors (Members)
The Greenery Ltd.: governed by Managers under Supervision of Professional
Supervisory Board.
ManagersProduct-related
Decision-Making Members
General reservesFinancial Structure
Individualized equity
Product priceMembers’ Benefits
Product price & return on capital
General grading of productsProduct Quality
Specific/client’s grading of products
Finally, the attribute Marketing Strategy was changed into Product Quality. Two
levels are considered, and the first one is General Grading of Products, or, a general
production grading line that could be followed for bulky products and anonymous buyers.
The second one is Specific/Client Grading of Products, where the co-op firm maintains a
grading line for specific buyers. Thus a total of six attributes with two levels each
resulted from the focus-group sessions (see table 2).
Design of Conjoint Study
The findings from the qualitative research were the input for the design of the
conjoint study. This limited number of attributes allowed for the use of the traditional
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full-profile conjoint method (Green and Srinivasan, 1978).  A 2 (Business Issue/Scope) ×
2 (Corporate Governance) × 2 (Product-Related Decision-Making) × 2 (Financial
Structure) × 2 (Members’ Benefits) × 2 (Products’ Quality) fractional factorial main-
effect-only design generated a set of eight calibration profiles. In addition, six holdouts
were generated, each of which were combined into three pairs of profiles. Thus, the total
number of profiles to be evaluated by each respondent was 14, with six of these profiles
were to be evaluated in pairs. In addition, respondents were asked to design their
preferred co-op structure by selecting one of the two levels for each attribute.
We chose the fractional factorial main-effects design to keep the number of
profiles to be evaluated at reasonable levels, and because we also assume that the
interaction effect between conjoint attributes are negligible. Thus, members overall
evaluations are formed by the sum of the utilities derived separately from the levels of the
six attributes.
For the final field study, respondents were selected on the basis of their size (in
economic and financial terms) and their degree of their involvement in the co-op’s
functioning. Thus, the largest and most active members were selected for this study. Most
computer guided personal interviews were conducted in connection to producer meetings,
which are held regularly on an annual basis in different regions all over The Netherlands.
Some interviews were conducted at the farms of the respondents due to their workload,
which did not allow them to join the pre-arranged meetings. In total, 120 persons
completed the interview, which were all held on an individual basis.
Respondents were asked to rate the eight calibration profiles according to their
preferences on a nine-point rating scale, which ranged from one (least preferred), to nine
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(most preferred). Subsequently, the respondents were asked to pick their most preferred
profile for each pair of holdout profiles, and rate the extent of their preference for that
profile on a seven-point rating scale, ranging from one (a bit more preferred) to seven
(much more preferred).
A pilot test was initially conducted to check the face validity and degree of
comprehensiveness of the conjoint task. Eight face-to-face interviews were conducted at
first, and members pointed out some changes. Most of them were wording related, and
hence the questionnaire was changed accordingly. Also, all the interviewed members
expressed a strong willingness to build their own MC profile by choosing one of the two
given levels of each given attribute. We considered that suggestion and asked respondents
to do so in our final interview.
Conjoint model
The conjoint analysis is grounded in a utility framework (see Lancaster;
Houthakker), which assumes that, in the context of our empirical study, producers derive
utility from the attributes of the co-op. It is assumed that the levels of the selected co-op’s
behaviorally-based attributes contribute in an additive way to members’ preferences.  In
the conjoint analysis the respondent is asked to rate or rank various so called profiles.
These profiles are a bundle of attributes with particular levels that represent a particular
coop.  The conjoint model can be formulated as follows:
(1)       ilj
L
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m
j
iik pxaP
j∑∑
==
+=
11
Where ikP   is  the preference of respondent i  for profile k , iα  a respondent-
specific intercept term (to be estimated), m  the number of attributes, jL  the number of
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levels of attribute, lgkχ  profile k ’s value of a dummy variable for level l  of attribute j ,
and it is equals to 1 if profile k has level l of attribute j and 0=kljχ   otherwise),  ijp  is
the (to be estimated) utility (part worth) that level l  of attribute j  has for respondent i .
Since the dependent variable is scaled from one to nine  in this study, it can be regarded
as approximately interval in nature. This allows for the use of ordinary least squares
(OLS) which is the most commonly used estimation procedure in conjoint analysis.
4. Results
In order to estimate the overall utility of the respondents we assumed that the
levels of the selected co-op’s behaviorally based attributes contribute in an additive way
to members’ preferences. In our case, a simple additive model represents the preference
structure for the MC internal structure as based on six factors (utility = business
issue/scope + corporate governance + product-related decision-making + financial
structure + members benefits + product quality). The preference for a specific MC profile
was directly calculated from the part-worth values.  With these part-worth estimates, the
preference of the selected sample of respondents was estimated for the 8 hypothetical MC
profiles, for the three holdout pairs, and for the self-constructed MC.
We first describe the degree of predictive validity for our individual level part-
worth estimates. A considerable difference in the signs of the part-worth estimates
between the predicted and real scores of holdout cases was found. For the first predicted
pair 38 different signs were found, 57 for the second predicted pair and 84 for the third
predicted pair. Thus, we proceeded by computing the so-called Tucker congruence
coefficient (Zegers & Berge) in order to identify the degree of association between the
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predicted and the observed scores of holdout pairs. The estimation of the Tucker
coefficient resulted in a mean of 0.157 and a standard deviation of 0.549. These results
reveal that the predictive validity of holdout pairs is low. Furthermore, based on the
individual conjoint part-worth estimates we examined the difference between the
predicted overall utility for their self-constructed predicted optimal co-op and the
predicted overall utility for the stated self-constructed optimal co-op. The distribution of
the differences across all respondents has a mean of 1.89 and standard deviation of 1.38.
Table 3. Estimated Mean Part Worths (MPWs) and Factors Importance (N = 90)
Attribute Level Estimated
MPWs
St. Dev.  of
MPWs
Factor
Importance
Entrepreneurial Market-Oriented Organization 0.287Business
Issue/Scope Intermediary Organization -0.287 0.562 19.9%
VTN: governed by Board of Directors (Members)
The Greenery Ltd.: governed by Managers under the
supervision of the Board of Directors of VTN
0.058Corporate
Governance
VTN: governed by Managers under supervision of
Board of Directors (Members)
The Greenery Ltd.: governed by Managers under
Supervision of Professional Supervisory Board.
-0.058
0.583 4.2%
Managers 0.161Product-related
Decision-Making Members -0.161 0.647 11.8%
General reserves -0.254Financial
Structure Individualized equity 0.254 0.515 18.7%
Product price -0.265Members’
Benefits Product Price & Return on Capital 0.265 0.542 19.5%
Product Quality General grading of products -0.330 0.578 24,3%
In order to identify whether or not respondents that scored low on one measure of
predictive validity (Tucker coefficient), also scored low on the other measure of
predictive validity (self-constructed optimal co-op) we compared their results. Hence, in
order to examine the relationship between the two measures we summarized data that fall
into these two predictive validity measures through crosstabulation estimates. Although
the correlation between the two compared variables was low (Cramer V = 0.259) and  not
statistically significant ( p > 0.05), there were serious indications that 6 respondents
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performed badly in both measures. In addition, we counted the number of reversals per
respondent for the holdout pair (whereas predicted sign of holdout part worth estimate
was not equal to the observed sign), and the number of reversals per respondents for the
self-constructed MC (whereas selected level was not equal to the level we predicted that
one should select).  Again, the strength of the relationship was not found significant (p >
0.05) and the correlation was found low (Cramer V = 0.223). Nevertheless, we found 24
respondents have a high degree of association and fall into both cases.
Table 4. Predicted Overall Mean Part-Worth Estimates  (OMPWs) and Comparison
of Actual and Estimated Rankings (N = 90).
Preference RankingMC Profiles OMPW Estimates
Estimated Actual
MC1 1.241 1 1
MC2 0.060 4 4
MC3 -0.342 6 5
MC4 0.373 2 3
MC5 0.250 3 2
MC6 -0.848 8 8
MC7 -0.502 7 7
MC8 -0.120 5 6
All in all, we considered that only 90 respondents out of the total of the sample (N
= 120) carried out the conjoint task consistently. Hence, the predictive validity of the
conjoint part-worth estimates turned out to be relatively low for 30 respondents. Because
our part worth estimates were on a common scale, we computed the relative importance
of each factor directly for the 90 remaining respondents (see table 3). The factor that
scores with the highest relative importance is the Product Quality (24,3%) followed by
Business Issue/Scope (19,9%), Members Benefits (19,5%), and Financial Structure
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(18,7%). The respondents attach less relative importance to Product-related Decision-
Making (11,8%) and even less to the Corporate Governance (4.2%).
Table 5. Principals’ Most Preferred MC Structure Model
The Greenery’s  Scope/Concept Entrepreneurial  market oriented organization
Corporate Governance VTN: governed by managers under supervision of BOD (Members)
The Greenery Ltd.: governed by managers under supervision of
professional Supervisory Board
Product-related Decision-Making Members
Financial Structure Individualized Equity
Members’ Benefits Product price & Return on Capital
Products’ Quality Specific grading of products
To examine the ability of our conjoint model to predict the actual choices of the
respondents, we predicted preference order by summing the part worths for the 8
different combinations of levels and then rank-ordering the resulting scores. Hence,
comparing the predicted preference order to the respodents’s actual preference order we
assessed the predictive accuracy of our model.  According to these results (see table 4)
the most preferred model is the first one in order (MC1).  For this MC model (see table 5)
both, actual and estimated, rankings are consistent. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned
here that only half of the estimated part-worths predict the preference order perfectly for
the 90 respondents.  This indicates that the preference structure was not so successfully
represented in the part-worth estimates and that the respondents did not make choices
fully consisted with the preference structure.
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5. Discussion and Conclusions
The structuring of market-oriented organizational structures is underutilised in the
field of agricultural economics and marketing. Nevertheless, under present conditions
members start re-structuring their processes in their co-ops because old balances have
changed. Thus, it seems that there is a gap between what practice is confronted and with
and what theory offers. The engagement between traditional co-op principles and the
system-driven co-op behaviour demand the acceptance that new co-op organisational
structures are required. Hence, the important question relates to the future structural
forms of co-op firms. Since, there is no a clear-cut commonly accepted understanding as
to which are these structural attributes of a co-op firm, we argue that concepts developed
in agricultural economics, marketing and organisational theory could provide a fruitful
integration and improve our understanding about re-structuring of co-op firms. We view a
co-op firm as coalition and we  propose the conceptualization of a principal-agent
behavioral relationship. Within this framework we investigated the principal preferences
(farmer-members) on the organizational structures of their agents (co-ops). The structure
of the co-op consists on the behavioural relations developed among the principals and the
strategic organisational apsects of the agent itself. We argue that theoretical application of
our behavioural framework offers a way of modeling how co-op firms can be internally
structured while preserving the preferences and interests of members to patronize and
control the organization.
More specifically, our framework proposes that the success of modern co-ops, in
holding their principal interests and at the same time being market-driven market,
depends on their principals’ preferences related to their developed behavioral
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interrelationships of their joint economic activity. Hence, their investment-driven
business nature can be enhanced. This can be supported by our results, which provide
evidence that member’s most preferred a MC structure (see table 5) consisting of
individualized equity shares and that allocation of benefits have to be based, next to
product price, on capital awards. In addition, members prefer their agent behaving as an
entrepreneurial market-oriented organization, and they express their preference to
develop a more direct link with their market segments by revealing a strong preference
for maintaining a grading line for specific buyers. The agent, according to the information
that members display, have to be governed by hired managers under the supervision of
the BOD, while the necessity for a professional supervisory board is revealed.
Finally, we recognise that our study faces two major limitations. First, the
predictive validity of our conjoint-part worth estimates turned out to be relatively low.
Thus, it remains to be investigated whether the low predictive validity is due to particular
groups of respondents, or to the fact that respondents had to react to a  multiattribute
experiment, which was not fully comprehensible for them. Second, our study’s proposed
conceptual framework is limited by the assumption that co-op participant preferences are
not conflicting. It does not address the issue of group choice when the preferences of the
members of a group are at least partially conflicting. However, we believe that extensions
of this model ought to consider that co-op members may not be homogeneous with
respect to the utility that they attach to particular attributes of the co-op. This is because
member firms differ from each other in many ways, the most important being the
specificity of production.  Therefore, future research agenda on co-op structures must
address the increasingly important issue of members’ heterogeneity in preferences. This
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could be modeled by assuming that there are different group of members, and that
member preferences are homogenous within groups, but heterogeneous across groups.
Therefore, member segments would be identified and therefore the current conceptual
framework would be placed in a more dynamic context where specific member-segments
reveal their preference for co-op’s organizational modes.
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